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Number Three

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE INVESTOR?
AN EVALUATION OF THE ASSAULT ON MERIT
REGULATION
Hugb H. Makenst
Merit regulation is under attack from critics who allege that it
unnecessarily delays or inhibits capital formation. The author
draws on his experience as both a state and federal securities
regulator and as a private securities practitioner to examine the
scope ofmerit regulation, analyze the criticisms, :z£Xlain why the
quantitative studies of the regulatory system have ailed to prove
its value, and recommend changes that would ead to a more
ejfective administration of merit standards.
INTRODUCTION

I.

An issuer desiring to make a public offering of securities must consider both federal and state statutes regulating the sale of securities. I
Although the federal laws, administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are the most familiar form of regulation,
state securities laws regulate both federally registered offerings and offerings exempt from federal registration. Many state securities acts,
sometimes referred to as blue sky laws,2 attempt to protect investors by
requiring some issuers to demonstrate to state securities administrators
the fairness of an investment opportunity before an offer or sale to the

t

B.S., Michigan Technological University, 1961; J.D., Northwestern University
Law School, 1964; Partner, Warner, Norcross & Judd, Grand Rapids, Mich.; President, North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), 19761977; Director, Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau, 1972-1978; Trial Attorney, Enforcement Division, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 19661972.
l. In adopting the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Congress chose not to preempt the state securities laws and thereby established
their concurrent jurisdiction. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Title I, § 18,48 Stat.
74,85 (current version at 15 U.S.c.A. § 77r (West 1981»; Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title I, § 28, 48 Stat. 881,903 (current version at 15 U.S.c.A.
§ 78bb (West 1981».
2. The phrase "blue sky law" refers to the state statutes' purpose of protecting the
investor from promoters who would sell stock in the blue sky itself. See Hall v.
Gieger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) ("speculative schemes which have no
more basis than so many feet of blue sky").
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public can occur. 3
The basic distinction between the standards applied in federal and
state securities registration is that the SEC is chiefly concerned with the
full and timely disclosure of all material information, while many state
laws, in addition to requiring disclosure, require that the offering meet
certain standards of fairness. This fairness requirement, referred to as
merit regulation, reflects very basic assumptions about the need to protect investors both from excessive investment risk and from self-serving
behavior by promoters and other insiders. 4
This two-tier system of regulation has been criticized as serving no
purpose other than to inhibit capital formation. 5 Other commentators
have responded by emphasizing the state's responsibility to protect all
investors within its jurisdiction, particularly unsophisticated investors. 6
The issue at the forefront of this debate is whether the benefits of merit
regulation as a measure of investor protection outweigh the costs associated with the requirements of merit regulation. 7 This issue has become perhaps the most controversial subject in the field of securities
regulation, as several states have recently considered the modification,
restriction, or elimination of merit regulation in their jurisdictions. 8
The debate, unfortunately, is grounded more on opinion than on
fact. A complete analysis of the costs and benefits of merit regulation
has yet to be made. This analysis is missing in part because the empirical data needed for a comprehensive study are so difficult to obtain. 9
The principal problem, however, is the lack of an appreciation of the
many intangible, non-quantifiable benefits of merit regulation. Consequently, past law review articles and books on merit regulation have
had difficulty assessing its value. 10
3. For a discussion on the historical origins of blue sky laws, see L. Loss & E.
COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 5-13 (1958).
4. For a thorough description and defense of these assumptions, see Tyler, More
About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982).
5. See, e.g., J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS
12,36-37 (1971); Bateman, State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma
and a Suggestion/or the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759, 778 (1973); Sosin
& Fein, The Landmark 1983 Amendments to the Illinois Securities Law, ILL. B.J.,
Dec. 1983, at 196.
6. See, e.g., Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation,
15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1444-45 (1969); Tyler, supra note 4, at 900, 935.
7. See Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367, 37071 (1977) (criticizing quantitative analysis of merit regulation's benefits for failure
to analyze cost factor).
8. See Sargent, The Challenge to Merit Regulation-Part I, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276
(1984) (surveying recent challenges to merit regulation).
9. See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
10. It is impossible to write about merit regulation without some bias. Mine arises
from experience as a member of the SEC enforcement division, as Director of the
Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau, as President of NASAA, and as a
private practitioner. Although I believe there are substantial flaws in the state
securities regulatory system, I advocate retaining the present structure until it is
shown that it is an ineffective means of investor protection in light of its impact on
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This article fills some of the gaps In the present debate by explaining how merit regulation works, why it generates so much hostility,
who it benefits, and how it can be improved. The central argument of
this article is that under many circumstances merit regulation is a
uniquely effective means of protecting the public investor that can be
made even more effective through greater cooperation among the state
administrators, the SEC, the securities bar, and the securities industry.
Section II of this article defines the scope of merit regulation, with
reference both to its range of application and its philosophical premises. Section III examines the current assaults in both the theoretical
literature and the state legislatures on merit regulation's value as a system of investor protection. This section identifies some of the practical
problems that lay behind the challenges to merit regulation. These
challenges have led to several attempts to quantify the benefits allegedly provided by merit regulation. Section IV examines why these
quantitative studies actually prove very little about merit regulation
and merely reflect the need for a new approach to the problem. Section
V outlines a new approach by explaining why some form of merit regulation is needed, and explores how that need can be met through a
greater cooperative effort among all of the parties affected by state securities regulation.
II.

THE SCOPE OF MERIT REGULATION

A.

An Overview

of the Merit

Concept and Registration Process

Although blue sky legislation varies from state to state; nearly all
jurisdictions require the registration of securities. I I In addition, since a
majority of states l2 have modeled their securities law on the Uniform
Securities Act (Uniform Act),13 most state securities acts are quite similar, especially with respect to the procedural aspects of the registration
process. 14 Not all state securities acts, however, permit the administra-

11.
12.

13.
14.

the securities market. Although critics of this article will be able to argue that its
conclusions are unsupported by either empirical data or historical documentary
evidence, my conclusions and impressions are firmly based on my experience in
the field.
The only jurisdiction that does not require some form of securities registration is
the District of Columbia. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 504-506 (Nov. 1980).
Thirty-nine jurisdictions have substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act
(the Uniform Act) or parts thereof: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. It!. ~ 1503. For citations to these jurisdictions, see Newman, Municipal
Securities and State Securities Laws: A New Look, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 558, 55859 n.3 (1984).
UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 201-419, 7A U.L.A. 567-698 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
The typical state law provides for three types of registration: (I) registration by
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tor to review the merits of an offering. 15 Administrators without merit
authority are empowered to review registration statements only from a
disclosure and antifraud perspective. 16 This distinction between merit
and non-merit review standards is reflected in the Uniform Act, which
defines several grounds for the denial of registration to a securities offering,17 only one of which, section 306(a)(2)(F), incorporates merit
standards. IS Furthermore, registration problems may arise in a merit
jurisdiction for reasons unrelated to the state's merit standards. 19
When a state applies merit regulation in its registration process, it
is attempting to channel investment capital into offerings that will give
investors a better chance to earn a return on their investment. The exclusive goal of merit regulation, therefore, is a very specific form of
investor protection. Recently, with the shift in emphasis to a more deregulatory environment, a trend has developed toward the realization
that an administrator may have a dual obligation, involving both investor protection and consideration of the overall economic climate for
business in determining the manner of application of the securities
laws.
The specific merit standard contained in the Uniform Act demonstrates how this goal is sought to be achieved. Section 306(a)(2)(F) authorizes the state administrator to deny registration if "the offering has
been or would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters'
and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promot-

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.

notification (a type of short-form registration in offerings whose issuers meet duration and earnings tests); (2) registration by coordination (for offerings pursuant
to a registration statement under the 1933 Act); and (3) registration by qualification (for all other offerings). See id §§ 302-04, 7A U.L.A. at 599-612.
The following jurisdictions are generally regarded as exercising some form of
merit regulation: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
For discussion of recent changes in this list, see Sargent, supra note 8. See
also Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New
Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 803-11 (1982) (surveying
current merit regulation standards and practices).
Maryland is an example of a state with disclosure-only review powers. See Miller,
A Prospectus on the Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. L. REV. 289, 292 (1963) (concluding that the Maryland statute "roughly approximates locally the coverage of
the two principal federal securities laws"); Sargent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a National Perspective, 13 U.
BALT. L. REV. 496, 515 (1984). Illinois has recently become a pure disclosure
jurisdiction. See Sosin & Fein, supra note 5, at 196.
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(A)-(I), 7A U.L.A. 620-21 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
Id § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. at 621.
For example, a filing may not be in reviewable condition because of inadequate
preparation or counsel's ignorance of the securities laws. Furthermore, an offering may encounter difficulty in a merit state because of disclosure problems or
because the transaction has fraudulent aspects.
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ers' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options."2o Other states go beyond such listings of specific merit criteria,
and apply provisions authorizing the administrator to deny registration
if the offering is not "fair, just and equitable."21 In essence, a blue sky
statute may contain both a provision identifying specific merit concerns
and a provision authorizing a broad consideration of fairness. 22
To an issuer who makes a securities offering, specific merit concerns present a composite of substantive standards that must be met to
offer securities in a particular state. The attorney attempting to comply
with these standards for the first time, however, may be puzzled to
learn that they often cover topics not specifically referenced in the
state's equivalent of section 306(a)(2)(F). For example, a state may impose very specific criteria relating to the competence of the issuer's
management, the organization of the offering, sale through qualified
persons, the use of the proceeds of the offering, limitations on the ability of the promoter to "cash-out" of an enterprise without the investor
having a similar opportunity, and adequacy of the business plan in the
prospectus. 23 The brief merit criteria referenced in the statute, therefore, merely represent a portion of the requisite merit standards. Indeed, most merit states will either by rule or informal policy apply
much more specific merit standards.
Perhaps the most familiar aspect of the merit regulation is its regulation of corporate offerings, particularly equity offerings. Most merit
states have specific rules relating to these offerings. 24 There are some
20. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1978).
21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1260(1) (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.28(1)(e)
(West 1983).
22. For a discussion of the adoption of a specific rather than a general merit review
standard in the Uniform Act, see L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 83-85 (1976).
23. An example of a detailed set of merit standards is the NASAA Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs. This document provides a detailed set of
guidelines for state administrators who review these offerings in terms of these
and other merit concerns. NASAA is the major organization of the securities
agencies of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Canadian provinces, and
Mexico. It has adopted and proposed guidelines and statements of policy for a
broad variety of merit concerns. The NASAA real estate guidelines are applied
by many merit jurisdictions through formal rules or on the basis of informal administrative policy. For the text of these guidelines, as effective January 1. 1984,
see I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 5352-5379 (Apr. 28, 1984).
For a discussion on state implementation of the NASAA real estate guidelines, see Subcommittee on Real Estate Programs, ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee, Survey of State Implementation and Application of the
Current NASAA Real Estate Guidelines (Apr. I, 1984) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office). See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying
text.
24. See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE §§ 510-50.33 to 040, reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~~ 25,434-25,440 (Aug. 1983); Mo. ADMIN. CODE §§ 30-52.050 to
.080, reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 35,455-35,458 (June 1982); WIS.
ADMIN. CODE §§ SEC 3.01-3.08, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~
64,521-64,528 (June 1984).
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national guidelines for merit review of various aspects of corporate equity offerings,25 but the different state rules or policies cover similar
issues and are applied in generally the same manner. These merit standards have received fairly extensive treatment in the secondary literature and need not be summarized in detail here. 26
Merit regulation has a significant impact primarily on public corporations in which insiders retain significant ownership or voting control. The effect of merit regulation on the problems created by the
separation of ownership and control is seen most vividly in the restrictions on officer and director compensation. The states restrict this compensation by objecting to excessive warrants and options,27 cheap
stock,28 and loans to insiders. 29 Some forms of compensation are curtailed to ensure promoter commitment to the project, provide for an
orderly secondary market, and increase the amount of capital actually
going to the project. 30 Anyone familiar with securities offerings would
identify these as basic objectives that underwriters, investment advisors, and attorneys should seek to achieve in structuring an offering for
an issuing entity. Much of the quarrel with these objectives thus relates
not to the propriety of the objectives but rather to the specific limitations imposed in their name.
Issuers whose offerings do not fit within merit constraints must
either modify the terms of the offering or face denial of the application
for registration. 3l The customary procedure, however, is for the administrator to negotiate with the registrant, a process that results in
either registration or voluntary withdrawal of the application. 32
Most registrations, whether of corporate equity offerings or other
types of offerings, are prepared with a recognition of potential blue sky
problems, and appropriate advance planning has been applied to the
25. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Cheap Stock, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
~~ 5311-5314 (Apr. 23, 1983) (cheap stock is stock sold to a specified class of promoters or other insiders at a price less than that at which the stock is offered to the
public).
26. See, e.g., Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?,
1976 WIS. L. REV. 79, 87-107; Hueni, supra note 6, at 1421-40; Tyler, supra note 4,
at 911-23.
27. See NASAA Statement of Policy, Options and Warrants, I BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 5321 (Sept. 17, 1980).
28. See supra note 25.
29. See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE § SEC 3.16, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
~ 64,536 (Dec. 1983).
30. See Goodkind, supra note 26, at 90-95; Tyler, supra note 4, at 910-15.
31. The application may be denied pursuant to the administrator's issuance of a stop
order. VNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a), 7A V.L.A. 620 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
32. Denial of an application seldom occurs since a registrant will ordinarily withdraw
an application once it becomes apparent that the administrator's merit (or other)
concerns cannot be satisfied. See Bartell, Merit Regulation and Clearing Strategy,
in STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
315,333 (D. Goldwasser & H. Makens eds. 1983).
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filing documents. 33 Nonetheless, there still may be a confrontation
with the administrator over the fairness of the offering. When this happens, the administrator has moved from the role of defender of certain
basic and non-controversial standards to that of negotiator of the economic terms of the transaction on behalf of the investor. If the underwriter has done an in-depth due diligence review, and if counsel has
carefully examined the potential blue sky implications of the terms of
the offerings, this will ordinarily not create a problem, because counsel
should be prepared to justify the apparently unfair provision to the
administrator. 34
The administrator assumes the role of investor's advocate because
the investor is not in a position to negotiate the terms of an offering on
his own behalf3 5 and because the underwriter is often unable to negotiate favorable terms for the investor without risk of losing the underwriting. 36 The administrator may initially assume, often correctly, that
the lead underwriter will provide only a minimum level of due diligence and fairness negotiation. 3? Through application of the merit
standards, the administrator seeks to establish a level of minimum fairness to the investor. These standards attempt to ensure that sufficient
funds are placed into a project to permit the success of the enterprise, to
prevent self-dealing that would strip the enterprise of vital capital resources, and to provide the investor with a means of self-help if the
transaction fails because of managerial wrong-doing. 38
The administrator's merit review, however, usually accompanies a
review of the quality of the registrant's disclosure. In fact, when a
merit administrator provides comments on an offering, the comments
are more likely to relate to the adequacy of disclosure than to merit
issues. Because many states will review most offerings, the state administrators are often able to identify internal inconsistencies, missing information, and similar problems. Many of these disclosure comments
relate to merit concerns. Specifically, the administrator may probe extensively for hidden compensation, conflicts and background information relating to the issuer or its affiliates, and may require specific
disclosure with respect to these typical merit concerns. Since the examination at the SEC does not always identify and resolve these
problems,39 it is fair to say that the states fulfill an important role in the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id at 324-33 (useful guide to this planning).
See id at 327-29.
See infra text following note 135.
See infra text accompanying notes 138-41.
Id This problem is compounded when the lead underwriter is an affiliate of the
issuer.
38. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section VII, 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5358 (Apr. 28, 1984) (requiring real estate program to provide participants with voting rights, access to records, rights to call meetings, and
certain consent powers).
39. See Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective ofthe Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, 26 UCLA L. REV. 147, 159-61 (1978)

442

Baltimore Law Review

(Vol. 13

area of disclosure.
Identification of these problems by an administrator in the course
of a merit review may prove beneficial to the issuer as well as to the
investor. Removal of either the appearance or the reality of overreaching, self-dealing, or conflict of interest often works to the advantage of the issuer by preventing future dispute and litigation. 40 Similarly, a merit requirement of a system of communication with investors
is likely to foster stable investor relations. 41 Restraints on the dumping
of cheap stock in the market are likely to keep the market for that security and other securities more reputable and hence more attractive to
investors. The industry and the issuer, as well as the investor, benefit
by these restraints. They should be self-imposed by the issuer, its counsel, or the underwriter, but when they are not, they should be imposed
by law.
Perhaps the most important aspect of merit regulation is the securities industry's voluntary compliance with published rules and guidelines. Insofar as the premises underlying merit standards are valid,
many companies include these protections without reference to the
guidelines or rules because it is in their self-interest to do so. In contrast, other issuers will comply with merit standards only because they
realize that without compliance they will face substantial problems in
meeting blue sky requirements. The net result, however, is that many
of the merit standards become industry standards, honed in a competitive environment over time. The development of an industry standard
has a dramatic effect on all offerings, public and private. In the real
estate field, for example, the controversial offerings of the early 1970's,
as modified in response to merit concerns, have become the models for
most of today's offerings. 42 The ripple effect of merit regulation thus
goes far beyond culling out the fraudulent or weak offerings. This vital
(SEC disclosure standards are not designed to require disclosure of the insider
abuse problems targeted by merit regulation). This author has frequently heard
complaints from state administrators that SEC examiners have not adequately
inquired into or required specific disclosure of promoter compensation, conflicts
of interest, or the proposed use of proceeds. These items are usually "material"
from a disclosure as well as a merit standpoint.
40. This intangible effect is virtually impossible to measure, but it should be considered one of the benefits of merit regulation. Unfortunately, both supporters and
critics of merit regulation tend to ignore it, at least in their published works.
41. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section VIl.C, 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5358 (Apr. 28, 1984); NASAA Statement of Policy,
Oil and Gas, Section VIII.B, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5229 (Sept. 22, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as NASAA Oil and Gas].
42. This is not to suggest, however, that the real estate syndication industry has been
entirely satisfied with state merit regulation of real estate programs. See Securities
Industries Association, SEC-NASAA Hearings on Federal-State Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Alan J. Parisse) (urging
more effective and cooperative regulation) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office).
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element of merit regulation has been ignored by all of the
commentators.
B.

A Case Study of How Merit Regulation Works: The NASAA Real
Estate Guidelines

Although each merit state has enacted regulations expressing the
merit standards to be applied by the blue sky administrator, these individual standards have not developed in a vacuum. Instead, the sources
of state merit regulation are usually the guidelines and statements of
policy developed by voluntary associations of state administrators. In
the past, three separate organizations developed these policy guidelines
and statements; today, only the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) remains active in this area. 43 NASAA is an
association composed of the securities administrators of the fifty states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Canadian Provinces, and
Mexico. In addition to providing a forum for joint action, its purposes
are the development of uniform laws and policies and the coordination
of enforcement activities. 44 Although NASAA guidelines and statements of policy do not bind its members, they provide a recommended
direction for states to follow. The current NASAA real estate guidelines are a good example of how merit standards can be used to promote uniform standards for investor protection in a specific type of
offering. 45
The NASAA guidelines require sponsors of real estate programs
to have at least two years of experience in real estate development. 46
This requirement is designed to prevent inexperienced people from using public funds to learn the business of real estate development. This
standard reflects the customary practice of most experienced securities
attorneys, who would rarely consider taking an issue public with unseasoned promoters. These attorneys would instead recommend that the
43. The organizations consisted ofNASAA, the Central States Administrators Council (CSAC), and the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association (MSCA). Today CSAC functions primarily as an enforcement forum, and not as a source of
merit guidelines or policy statements. MSCA was merged into NASAA in 1979,
but some of its former members constitute the core of NASAA's merit regulation
committee. Makens, Administration and Relationship with other Agencies, in
MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION 15, 22-23 (c. Moscow & H. Makens eds.
1983).
44. NASAA's major efforts in this direction have included the development of standardized forms, see I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 5111-5121 (Jan. 1984), statements of policy, see id ~~ 5151-5385 (Apr. 1984), and the Uniform Limited
Offering Exemption (ULOE), see id ~ 5294 (Oct. 1983).
45. Although these guidelines are technically designated a "Statement of Policy," they
are usually referred to as guidelines. Consequently the two terms will be used
interchangeably in this article. See Hildebrandt, Regulation 0/ Real Estate Securities, in BLUE SKY LAWS: STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES 295-304 (J. Halprin
& H. Makens eds. 1984) (refers throughout to NASAA real estate "guidelines").
46. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section II.A, I BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 5353 (Sept. 21, 1983).
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client consider either a private offering with a limited number of investors or a joint venture with experienced partners. Similarly, most reputable brokerage firms would not consider handling a real estate offering
with inexperienced promoters. Nonetheless, to the extent some attorneys and brokerage firms do not exercise the self-restraint necessary to
prevent these clients from promoting real estate offerings, the guidelines provide a necessary degree of investor protection.
The guidelines also require real estate sponsors to meet certain net
worth requirements. 47 The basic requirement that a sponsor be able to
meet the financial obligations of a public program is certainly a reasonable method to ensure the general partner's financial commitment to
the project.
The real estate guidelines also establish suitability standards for
investors. 48 These standards vary with the nature of the programs. For
example, a program with a tax shelter orientation will customarily require investors to have a substantial net worth and be in a tax bracket
that will allow them to take advantage of the tax benefits provided by
the program. 49 As a practical matter, since many real estate syndications have a significant tax orientation, the net worth test applied by the
Internal Revenue Code with respect to the safe harbor for partnerships50 have become the industry standard, and they comport with the
NASAA guidelines. In contrast, the net worth and income suitability
standards applied to real estate programs designed to produce income
for the investor rather than to provide a tax shelter are substantially
lower. 51
In addition to requiring the investor to meet suitability standards,
the guidelines require the investor to make a certain minimum investment. 52 The concept of minimum investment has been debated both
within and without NASAA for several years. The minimum investment requirement perhaps can be best justified as a means of creating
an incentive for the investor to read the prospectus carefully or to
spend the amount needed for competent professional advice. The critics assail the concept as assuring a minimum loss.
The heart of merit regulation through the real estate guidelines is
the requirement that "[t]he total amount of consideration of all kinds
which may be paid directly or indirectly to the sponsor or its affiliates
shall be reasonable, considering all aspects of the syndication program
and the investors."53 The guidelines also indicate the type of consider47. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section II.B, 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 5353 (Apr. 28, 1984) [hereinafter cited as NASAA Real Estate).
48. Id at Section III, ~ 5354.
49. Id at Section III.A.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1967).
51. NASAA Real Estate, supra note 47, Section III.B.4, ~ 5354.
52. Id at Section III.D., ~ 5354.
53. Id at Section IV.A.I., ~ 5355.
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ation that is customarily received in these real estate programs, 54 and to
require that a substantial portion of the program's capital contributions
be applied toward the investment in properties. 55 Except in very highly
leveraged programs (a type not normally made available through public offerings), it is reasonable to require that a substantial portion of the
proceeds collected from investors be devoted to the actual purchase
and development of the properties rather than in payment of fees to
promoters. While definition of the appropriate percentage is certainly
subject to debate, the concept that an investor's money is much more
likely to yield a return if it is used to purchase property rather than to
pay promoters seems unquestionable. There are perhaps some situations in which this requirement does not make absolute sense, such as
when a promoter has obtained the property at an exceptionally good
price or has negotiated unusually favorable financing, but these situations are relatively uncommon, especially in public programs. In my
experience, most national programs meet or significantly exceed the
guidelines' requirements for the use of proceeds.
The equity interests in the program retained by the promoters are
also closely regulated by the guidelines. The guidelines require the receipt of benefits from these promotional interests to be deferred until
investors have received a certain return on their capital contributions. 56
Real estate brokerage commissions on resale of the property are also
limited. 57 The guidelines permit payment of a property management
fee, capped at different percentages for residential properties and for
industrial and commercial properties. 58
The discussion above is only a brief explanation of the NASAA
guidelines for real estate programs and is intended to illustrate the
goals of merit regulation of these programs. 59 It is important to emphasize, however, that the merit standards imposed by these guidelines
were not arbitrarily selected or developed without careful attention to
the realities of the industry and the marketplace. NASAA guidelines
are traditionally developed through a committee designated for the
purpose of studying a particular subject for guidelines. The committee
prepares guidelines for public comment and subsequently presents
them to the NASAA membership for vote on adoption. 60 The standards for promoter compensation, for example, were based on extenId at Section IV.A.l.a.-h.
Id at Section IV.C.1.-2.
Id at Section IV.E.
Id at Section IV.F.
Id at Section IV.G.
For more detailed discussion, see Hildebrandt, supra note 45, at 304-11; Sargent &
Pollitt, Introduction to State Securities Regulation (Blue Sky Law), ALI-ABA, EFFECT OF SECURITIES REGULATION ON REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 179 (1983).
60. Beyond this basic sequence, however, NASAA has not followed any definite procedure for the drafting adoption of guidelines and statements of policy, and this
has contributed substantially to the level of controversy that has surrounded some
of the NASAA pronouncements.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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sive testimony about the level of compensation ordinarily paid in the
industry to promoters providing similar services. 61 In addition, this
area, perhaps more than any other, experiences extensive negotiation
between administrators and sponsors about the application of the
guidelines to particular transactions, and the requirements are frequently modified to meet the needs of individual programs.
Most aspects of the NASAA guidelines do not burden the affected
class of issuers. For example, with respect to real estate programs, the
NASAA guidelines have served not only as a basis for merit regulation
but also as the basis for SEC review. 62 In addition, the guidelines were
first implemented at the time of the initial development of the real estate syndication industry.63 As a result, many of the standards established by these guidelines have become industry standards applied by
the promoters regardless of the extent or kind of regulation to be applied to a particular offering. 64 The development of these standards
certainly has not hindered the dynamic growth of the real estate syndication industry, and probably has helped to ensure the stability and
public confidence in this form of investment. The real estate guidelines
have also promoted compliance with the SEC disclosure policies because they have had the effect of forcing a great number of private real
estate offerings to change drastically the nature and extent of disclosure, as well as the structure of offering and the promoter compensation
structure. The prospectuses used in private real estate offerings of the
early 1970's bear little resemblance to their counterparts today. Both
the level of disclosure and the economics of these programs have been
dramatically affected by merit regulation to the advantage of the
investor.
This type of regulation also works to the benefit of the industry.
To the extent that the real estate syndication industry could have been
61. This author was a member of the NASAA Committee that drafted the first real
estate guidelines in 1976.
62. A review of SEC Industry Guide 5: Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Interests in Real Estate Limited Partnerships, printed in I FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 3829 (May 4, 1983), will show the congruence of SEC disclosure and
NASAA merit concerns.
63. See Kuklin, Corporate and Real Estate Relationships-"Through the Looking
Glass," ALI-ABA,' EFFECT OF SECURITIES REGULATION ON REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 17 (1983) (discussing the interrelation of securities law and real
estate transactions in the syndicated offerings developed in the past fifteen years);
see also Makens, supra note 39, at 151 ("The early tax shelter offerings were so
excessive in front-end promoter's compensation that they would have been an
embarrassment to Jesse James. It was merit regulation at the state level, not disclosure or market factors, which ended the excesses. . . . ").
64. This is perhaps the inevitable result of the fact that syndicators simply had to
comply with the merit requirements of administrators in major states such as California, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas. For a description of how the same phenomenon is occuring in the context of another securities product (publicly traded
limited partnerships), see Publicly Traded Limited Partnership: An Emerging Financial Alternative to the Public Corporation, 39 Bus. LAW. 709, 714 (1984).
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labeled as one in which promoter self-dealing is common, it would
have lost stature as a legitimate investment vehicle. This problem has
been largely avoided in national real estate programs. My belief is that
the industry's phenomenal growth has benefited from merit regulation.
This does not mean that all the guidelines promoted by NASAA
represent the proper level of merit regulation needed in each state. At
times, NASAA guidelines have been inappropriate and too heavily
weighted in favor of what is perceived by administrators as investor
protection. A current example of this problem is the handling of limitations on the amount of cheap or lower priced stock that promoters
. may retain in connection with new offerings. 65
Many states require this so-called "cheap stock" to be placed in
escrow. 66 In 1983, NASAA adopted "cheap stock guidelines"67 that
represent an excessive use of merit authority. These guidelines require
cancellation of the stock unless the issuer achieves certain earnings
within specified periods, regardless of the performance of the market or
industry in which the issuer operates or of any other external considerations. 68 NASAA is currently planning to revise these guidelines in the
near future. 69 Although not without some flaws, the existing real estate
guidelines offer a model of how effective guidelines can be developed
in a manner consistent with NASAA's goal of investor protection.
III.

THE ASSAULT ON MERIT REGULATION

In some states, merit regulation today is under siege. It was substantially eliminated in Illinois, one of the leading merit jurisdictions,
by legislative action in 1983. 70 A similar attempt to eliminate merit
regulation in Texas was narrowly defeated,11 but significant reductions
in its scope resulted from legislative changes in Wisconsin72 and Iowa 73
during 1983. Comparable changes have been considered and apparently rejected in at least two other states, Arizona and Missouri. 74
65. For discussion of the issues associated with merit regulation of cheap stock, see
Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
1447, 1464-67 (1969); Goodkind, supra note 26, at 90-93; Hueni, supra note 6, at
1423-28; Tyler, supra note 4, at 912-13.
66. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.305(f)(1) (1978); 64 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 207.071,
reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 48,468 (Jan. 1982); WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ SEC 3.04, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 64,524 (Dec. 1983).
67. NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~
5312-5314 (Apr. 23, 1983).
68.1d
69. These revised guidelines will be drafted by NASAA's Cheap Stock Committee,
chaired by R.G. Tucker, Chief Deputy, Montana Securities Division.
70. For discussion of the change in Illinois, see Sosin & Fein, supra note 5, at 196.
71. The proposed changes in the Texas law are discussed in Bromberg, Texas Securities Act, TEX. B.J., Jan. 1983, at 36.
72. On the Wisconsin developments, see WIS. SEC. BULL., July 1983, at 2-4.
73. On the Iowa developments, see 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 963 (May 20,
1983).
74. See Sargent, supra note 8, at 284-85.
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Some states have acted administratively to narrow their own authority,
such as Michigan. 75 These efforts are the result of substantial uncertainty and skepticism about the premises and efficiency of the merit
regulatory system. The depth of this uncertainty and skepticism is suggested by the variety of criticisms leveled at merit regulation.
F or example, it has been argued that market forces should govern
the sale of securities, and that as long as "full disclosure" is provided,
no further regulation is necessary or appropriate, particularly the paternalistic regulation implicit in the use of merit standards. 76 Some contend that inexperienced or untrained securities examiners and
administrators lack the expertise needed for intelligent evaluation of
most offerings.77 It has been argued that the efficient working of the
market will provide adequate investor protection,78 and that merit regulation is unnecessary. Similarly, it has been said that the best allocation of scarce state securities regulatory resources is fighting fraud
through enforcement, not fighting reams of prospectuses used in offerings in which little if any fraud may be involved. 79 The net effect of
these arguments may lead to the suggestion that the federal disclosure
system provides adequate protection in public offerings and that state
review is redundant, except perhaps in the case of wholly intrastate
offerings.80
Particular aspects of merit regulation are arguably not only ineffective in providing investor protection, but that the merit process goes
beyond establishing "fairness" and attempts to negotiate the final terms
of an economic relationship on behalf of one of the parties to the extreme detriment of the other without a legislative mandate to do so.
Similarly, it may be asserted that application of merit standards undercuts the clear legislative intent expressed in the state corporation laws. 8!
Most vehement, perhaps, are the practitioners' complaints that some
administrators regulate in an irrational manner by attempting to exclude entire categories of offerings,82 by applying personal standards
75. On the Michigan developments, see id at 283; see also MICH. ADMIN. CODE R.
451.706.26 (1984), reprinted in lA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 32,467 (Jan. 1984).
76. See Bateman, supra note 5, at 781-82.
77. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 934-35.
78. See Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 7, at 367-69.
79. See Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 1481-85.
80. Id at 1492-93.
81. General corporation statutes tend to have a broadly enabling character, allowing
a basic separation of ownership and control. See generally Werner, Corporation
Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611 (1981). To the extent that
the blue sky laws represent an attempt to impose greater restraints on the possibility of managerial misconduct and self-dealing behavior associated with that separation, they are somewhat inconsistent with the intent of the state corporation
laws.
82. See L. Loss & E. COWElT, supra note 3, at 76-77 (because of their substantial
experience with abusive practices in certain types of highly speculative offerings,
some administrators may tend to treat all offerings of that type with a negative
attitude).
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inconsistent with those imposed by other administrators,83 or by ignoring the requirements of the state administrative procedure acts. 84
One commentator has suggested that merit regulators are ineffective in protecting investors because the perpetrators of flagrant types of
fraud simply ignore the registration requirements, and that the devotion of state resources to enforcement would produce a greater degree
of. investor protection. 8s The same commentator has recommended
that the appropriate focus of efforts to protect public investors is the
general corporation statute, not the blue sky law, and that the public
policy concerns of merit regulation would be best served by reform of
those statutes. 86 As if these criticisms are not enough, it has further
been alleged that merit regulation has an adverse effect upon local employment opportunities. 87
These criticisms have been debated elsewhere,88 and do not require reconsideration here. What is needed is some discussion of the
very practical reasons for the unpopularity of merit regulation. It is
perhaps fair to state that the current assault on merit regulation has
been generated by a sense of frustration with the formulation and application of merit policy.89 This general sense of frustration has several
specific sources.
Possibly the most important source is the inherent difficulty associated with a regulatory system based on substantive standards of fairness. Fairness is a will-O'-the-wisp, difficult to describe, and impossible
to define. Certain aspects of fairness appear clear to the extent they are
stated as statutory requirements, rules, guidelines, or forms, but even
these pronouncements are subject to interpretation, and not all merit
policies are stated in these written sources. As with the SEC and other
83. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 923-26.
84. There has been very little written on the applicability of state administrative law
to blue sky law. For an introduction to the problem, see DeYonker, Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, in MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION 221 (C.
Moscow & H. Makens eds. 1983).
85. Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 148l.
86. Id at 1484.
87. See Statement of Jack Bailey, Iowa Development Commission, 15 SEC. REG. L.
REP. (BNA) 1882 (Oct. 7, 1983). The decision to locate in a state is based on
fundamentals such as the availability of human and material resources, cost of
building, leasing, or owning facilities, transportation, state tax or workers' benefits
structure, attractiveness of the community, and the generation of ideas that give
rise to the business opportunity. Financing is an element to consider, but the blue
sky laws have never been a decisive factor in my experience or those of the attorneys whom I have queried. This argument has been raised in states where merit
regulation has been under recent attack as the basis for excluding certain "high
tech" companies from developing in those states. A far more likely scenario is
that those states do not have an existing industrial base or a strong program of
research in their universities that are the bases for development of that type of
company, and these factors, combined with the elements for a location decision,
determine where high tech companies spring forth.
88. See, e.g., Hueni, supra note 6; Tyler, supra note 4.
89. For another version of this argument, see Sargent, supra note 8, at 279-80.
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regulatory agencies, policy is defined, interpreted, and debated in a variety of contexts, including speeches by administrators, agency releases,
administrative proceedings and litigation, professional articles, and by
practitioners themselves. 90 Merit regulation also falls short of absolute
definition because it must respond to the facts of each particular offering. In addition, new forms of compensation, new products, new industries, new types of securities, and new approaches to regulation at
the federal level all preclude development of a truly and perennially
complete set of merit requirements. Written regulation invariably lags
behind changes in an industry, regardless of the type of change. For it
to be otherwise, administrators would need a crystal ball or would have
to be willing and able to stifle business change and development.
It is thus difficult to state all merit requirements as administrative
rules. Merit regulation is the imposition of arbitrary fairness standards
to a securities offering. All regulation is arbitrary to some extent, but
merit regulation is more so since it is often applied at the sole discretion
of a single individual on an ad hoc basis. This inherent problem has
produced much frustration among securities practitioners and has
helped generate the current assault upon merit regulation. This problem has been exacerbated by the failure of some states to attempt any
meaningful merit rulemaking. 91 Whether an administrator's excuses
are an overburdened staff or other priorities, the failure to express established policy in some written form is costly to issuers in these states
and to those involved in interstate offerings seeking to comply with the
tremendous diversity of state laws.
Another source of frustration is what administrators refer to as the
"smell" test. 92 If something about the offering strikes the administrator
as illogical or improper, the administrator typically will make a much
closer inspection of the offering. These expanded inquiries frequently
are made with good cause because experienced administrators are
quick to spot disclosures that appear to disguise more than they reveal
or to camouflage problems with omissions. Discovery of underlying
problems will then lead to rigorous application of the specific merit
requirements. The administrator's decision to inspect more closely a
particular offering, however, may appear arbitrary to the persons involved in that offering.
90. For discussion on the research tools useful for reaching these different sources of
blue sky law, see Sargent & Greenberg, Research in Securities Regulation: Access
to the Sources of the Law, 75 L. LIBR. J. 98, 105-09, 119-20 (1982).
91. A review of the BLUE SKY LAW REPORTER (CCH) will show that a fair number of
merit states have failed to adopt detailed merit regulations. See BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) (4 vols.). Experienced blue sky practitioners will report, however,
that these states might apply one or more sets of very detailed NASAA guidelines
on a purely informal basis.
92. See L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 3, at 77 ("[A] midwestern administrator
replied that he looked on uranium issues with a 'jaundiced eye' and tended to
disapprove them 'unless they are of such a nature that we might be tempted to
invest our own money in them' ").
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Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of merit regulation to many
practitioners is the demonstration of prejudice by the administrator
with respect to certain types of offerings. 93 Blanket disapproval of a
particular industry or method of doing business is rarely justified and
tends to bring the entire merit regulatory system into disrepute. Merit
regulation is not intended to provide this type of power and its exercise
in this manner is a gross abuse of discretion.
The problems with imprecise standards, the smell test, and administrator prejudice are compounded by the "echo effect." The echo effect can often be observed during a national offering, and it can cause
an issuer problems with clearance. It works quite simply. First, one
state will make a somewhat unusual merit comment. That comment is
then circulated in an informal network among state administrators.
Just as the issuer resolves the comment with the first administrator, an
echo of the comment is heard in some other state. Since that second
state may have a different approach to the problem than the first state,
the issuer may find itself negotiating a different solution to the same
problem.
These problems are also compounded by uncertainty over whether
a given state is a "merit" state94 or whether a merit state will choose to
exercise its merit powers in a particular case. The phrase merit regulation is bandied about as though it had a very solid and identifiable
form. It is far more amorphous than that. Some states possessing merit
powers will apply them only occasionally, either ignoring all but a few
offerings or relying almost exclusively on clearance in the "tough"
states as a basis for signoff on an offering. Frequently counsel hears,
"Have you cleared X state?" If he has, prompt clearance is often forthcoming in the second state. The rigorous merit states number no more
than a dozen at any time,95 and the composition of the group may vary
according to whether the administrator is young, inexperienced, or
tempered by experience. 96 This variation in administration seems unfair to issuers, but the variation is usually little worse than that incident
to drawing a difficult branch chief or examiner at the SEC or the difference between bringing a complaint to the Justice Department or the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) during the Carter or Reagan admin93. See Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 1492; see also NASAA Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 n.l (Sept. 21, 1983) (expressing
NASAA's suspicion of tax shelter offerings).
94. For discussion of this question in Massachusetts, see Honig, Massachusetts Securities Regulation: In Search of the Fulcrum, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 474-76 (1984).
95. Those states as of this writing are probably Arizona, California, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. On the phenomenon of leaders and followers, see Gray, Blue Sky Practice-A Morass?, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1519, 1529-30 (1969).
96. See id at 1522 (discussing variations in experience and attitude among state
administrators).
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istrations. It does not make the result equitable, but no one has ever
claimed that government is totally fair, just, and equitable.
While all of the problems discussed above have generated resentment of merit regulation, there are perhaps three principal causes for
. the present challenges to merit regulation. 97 The first is an administrator's rigid adherence to specific standards 'or policies when the offering,
taken as a whole, is beneficial to investors. A real estate program that
meets the guidelines, but has a marginal general partner, will in some
states clear more easily than one with a financially strong and highly
reputable general partner who has designed his program out of compliance with one relatively unimportant aspect of the guidelines. The offering with the marginal general partner is probably far more risky to
the investor than the offering with the substantial general partner, but
that distinction makes little difference to those administrators who rigidly adhere to the letter of the guidelines without regard to the overall
merit of the offering. The administrator who permits an offering to
clear without strict compliance with the guidelines may be embarrassed
if the program fails, but he should be willing to take that risk, recognizing that the possible reward to investors and business in general outweighs the potential threat to the investor. Widespread adoption of
this balanced attitude would also help dispel the impression that merit
regulators do not understand the transactions they are trying to regulate. A refusal to follow this approach, however, produces understandable resentment.
The second principal cause derives from the personal behavior of
a few administrators and their staffs. The perception that attorneys and
their clients have of state regulation is largely shaped by the manner in
which they are treated by staff examiners. Attorneys who deal with
examiners should do so in a professional manner. It is reasonable to
expect that the same professional courtesy will be extended by the examiners and the rest of the staff. In my.experience and that of other
securities practitioners, inexperienced or overly aggressive examiners
have sometimes failed to act in a professional manner. When that happens, and particularly when it happens on a regular basis, the reputation of that examining state is damaged nationally because the
examiner deals with so many attorneys. The examiner who insults an
attorney, questions his integrity, refuses to return telephone calls, or is
overly aggressive on the telephone brings discredit to the entire
NASAA organization and to each of the many administrators and examiners who conduct themselves in a professional manner. It is extraordinary to hear of this problem at the SEC, and NASAA should be
able to make the same boast. This negative perception, brought about
by the conduct of a few, is fueling the fires for reasons unrelated to the
97. For a survey of the legislative results of the challenges, see Sargent, supra note 8,
at 282-85.
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underlying value of merit regulation. 98
The third principal cause is a tendency toward strained state interpretations of the law in a manner contrary to published NASAA guidelines. This behavior may place a single state at odds with the rest of the
country, producing unnecessary delays in clearance, as well as undermining NASAA's efforts to produce uniformity. The non-uniform actions of a leading merit jurisdiction can have a disproportionate impact
on many states and generate even more resentment of merit regulation.
Although the resentment created by these problems is understandable, they do not justify elimination of merit regulation. These
problems indicate the need for greater discipline, professionalism, and
coordination among NASAA members. The possible solutions to these
problems are complex and will be considered in greater detail below.
Progress will require vastly improved training of new state administrators and examiners, development of better communications systems
among the states, improvement in the drafting and the interpretation of
written merit standards expressed in NASAA guidelines or through
state rules, growth in the administrators' awareness of the public opinion of their regulatory systems, expansion of the administrative policymaking procedure to include local professionals and other citizens, and
removal of those administrators or staff members who refuse to operate
within the norms of the system. Only progress in these directions will
alleviate the practical problems that have produced so much hostility
and misunderstanding.
IV.

THE QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF MERIT
REGULATION: ONLY PART OF THE PICTURE

Despite the theoretical debate over merit standards, all recent efforts to determine the value of merit regulation through quantitative
analysis have been notably unsuccessfu1. 99 The authors of these studies
have been like the four blind men who were taken to different parts of
the elephant and asked to describe what the elephant looked like. One
98. For a discussion of the kind of problems generated by the perception ofunprofessionalism, see Securities Industries Association, SEC-NA SAA Hearings on FederalState Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Stephen Bloomenthal, transcript at 12) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore
Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Stephen Bloomenthal].
99. The studies to be discussed in this article are: Goodkind, supra note 26, at 107-23;
Kudla & Jennings, An Evaluation oj the .EJlicacy oj Merit Review by Arizona's Securities Division (June 30, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office); Walker & Hadaway, Merit Standards
Revisited: An Empirical Analysis oj the Efficiency of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J.
CORP. L. 651 (1982). In addition, the FTC in early 1984 solicited comments on a
proposed FTC sponsored quantitative analysis of merit regulation. See Comment
Letter from Robert J. Millstone, ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee,
to Don Arbuckle, FTC Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Mar. 13,
1984) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office) [hereinafter
cited as ABA-FTC Comment Letter].
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described the trunk, another the tail, another a foot, and the last a side,
but none understood or described an entire elephant. The merit regulation studies in question compared only the performance of issuers
whose offerings have cleared a state against those whose offerings were
denied. This approach is fundamentally flawed because it does not
measure the major effect of merit regulation: voluntary compliance
with merit standards. The studies tell us nothing about how widespread this type of voluntary compliance may be or how it is affected
by changes in merit policy. Similarly, this approach does not measure
a major effect of merit regulation until months or years after the completion of the offering, when investors seek to use the safeguards
against mismanagement, fraud, or incompetence mandated by merit
regulation. 1°O Furthermore, this approach cannot gauge the impact of
merit standards that subsequently become adopted as industry standards. By missing all of these vital issues, the existing quantitative
studies prove very little.
The oldest published quantitative study of merit regulation is
Goodkind's 1976 analysis of the operation of Wisconsin merit standards.101 The principal feature of Goodkind's article is the analysis of
seven principal factors that are applied in determining the fairness of
corporate offerings. His explanation of the underlying rationales, an
exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of the merit approach,
is excellent. Goodkind's quantitative analysis is a statistical comparison of the performance of corporate issuers whose offerings were registered or withdrawn in Wisconsin over the four year period 19681971. 102 Goodkind used three indices of performance to compare the
two classes of issuers: price, book value, and dividend distribution. 103
Although noting several qualifications to his conclusions, Goodkind's
net determination was that the Wisconsin merit standards resulted in
the exclusion from Wisconsin markets of offerings presenting a risk of
severe investment loss. His study thus established a prima facie case
100. See, e.g., NASAA Oil and Gas, supra note 41, at Section VIII; NASAA Real Estate, supra note 47, at Sections VII, IX.A, ~~ 5358, 5359A.
101. Goodkind, supra note 26, at 107-23.
102. Withdrawal may be caused by adverse comments from the administrator, but it
also may be triggered by successful completion of sales of the securities in other
states while waiting to resolve conflicts in the states from which withdrawal is
eventually made. Withdrawal may also occur because of conditions totally unrelated to blue sky regulation, including a change in market conditions, the occurrence of adverse events affecting the issuer, underwriting difficulties, or national
events unrelated directly to the field of securities or the issuer. Measurement of
the blue sky law impact on companies that have withdrawn issues from states is
difficult, unless one is able to isolate those issuers who have successfully marketed
their securities, but failed to register in certain states. Even then obtaining information as to the underlying cause of nonregistration is exceptionally difficult.
103. Goodkind, supra note 26, at 108. Goodkind also gathered data on business failures, finding that 23.5% of the non-clearing issuers were failures (defined as a loss
of more than 75% of the market value of their stock) after three years. Id. at 121.
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for maintaining those registration standards in place. 104
Goodkind's study has been criticized both for its methodology 105
and its failure to quantify the costs of merit regulation. 106 The principal limitation of the research is its evaluation of only a single aspect of
merit regulation: merit review of corporate equity offerings. His conclusions are most helpful with respect to that aspect of the regulatory
scheme, but are of limited usefulness to an evaluation of the overall
impact of merit regulation.
A 1982 study of the efficacy of Texas merit standards by Walker
and Hadaway 107 had a similarly narrow focus. The Texas study compared corporate issuers that withdrew their application for registration
of common stock with a selected set of companies whose stock was
cleared for sale in Texas between 1975-1980.108 By limiting their review to corporate offerings, Walker and Hadaway focused on only a
small percentage of the offerings filed in and subject to merit review by
the Texas Securities Board. Although this study concluded that merit
review as a whole is producing its intended result of "equiponderating
the positions of the new and existing investors,"I09 it is impossible to
reach a general policy determination on the basis of this evidence without a review of the performance of partnership as well as corporate
issues. In short, the Texas study provides additional information on
104. Id at 111-12. Goodkind concluded that:
Those [rules] limiting offering price, options and warrants, and underwriting commissions and expenses proved especially effective, as did
those requiring earnings sufficient to cover interest and dividend obligations, and requiring a minimum promoters' investment. In addition, the
data indicate that the Commissioner's discretionary authority has been
quite effectively utilized for the protection of Wisconsin investors, and
support the rule dealing with cheap stock. . . .
For those who have attacked the rules as unnecessary restrictions on
free enterprise and unwarranted limitations on promoters' profits, the
results provide a convincing rebuttal.
Id at 123. Goodkind qualified this conclusion, however, by emphasizing that:
[T]he aggregate results produced by the study concealed tremendous internal variations. Hidden by the averages set forth herein are
many issuers whose performance was exceptionally good despite their
inability to obtain registration in Wisconsin, and some registrants which
failed miserably. The range for both groups is large enough to suggest
that the present rules, even though empirically justifiable, leave room for
improvement.
Id
105. Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 7, at 376 ("The Wisconsin study is so methodologically flawed that it yields no useful information on the very interesting problem it
posed"). Mofsky & Tollison's conclusion does not do credit to the study that was
the pioneering constructive effort to evaluate merit regulation.
106. Id at 370-71. Mofsky & Tollison offer little on this issue with their simplistic
understanding of "cost" and omission of benefit.
107. Walker & Hadaway, supra note 99.
108. Id at 659-62.
109. Id at 680.
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one narrow facet of merit regulation, but contributes only a limited
amount to the understanding of the overall picture.
The more recent attempts at quantitative analysis have contributed
virtually nothing to an appreciation of the effectiveness of merit regulation. An uncompleted study of the effects of state merit regulation by
the FTC, begun in 1984, had the same narrow focus as the Wisconsin
and Texas studies--corporate equity offerings-and therefore could
not provide a meaningful evaluation of the overall value of merit regulation. 11O The FTC proposal was criticized extensively by both
NASAA and the ABA's State Regulation of Securities Committee of
the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law for this and
other problems with the study design. III
A 1983 study by Kudla and Jennings of the Arizona registration
process I 12 appears to be an unsuccessful attempt to provide support for
a presumption ll3 that merit regulation should be abolished. The authors attempted to compare the performance of issuers of registered
and withdrawn offerings, 114 but it is difficult to attach any significance
to their conclusions since they received a very poor response to their
questionnaire. I 15 Especially questionable is the authors' conclusion
that the merit system discriminates against small issuers and thereby
ItO. The FTC described its project in "Supporting Statement for a Survey to Assess
State Registrations of Common Stock Securities Issued in 1976 and 1979" (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review
office).
Ill. See Comment Letter from Michael J. Unger, NASAA President, to Don
Arbuckle, FTC Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, Feb. 13, 1984 (copy
on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office). The ABA's criticisms
were set forth in the ABA-FTC Comment Letter, supra note 99. That letter concluded that the:
FTC's proposed survey is not an appropriate mechanism for eliciting
meaningful analysis of state merit regulation of securities. Problems resulting from the narrow scope of the survey, design of questions, inadequate access to securities law expertise and limited data source will
restrict the usefulness of the data produced and make it difficult to
extrapolate.
Id at 4.
112. See Kudla & Jennings, supra note 99.
1l3. See Letter of Marianne Jennings and Ron Kudla to Governor Bruce Babbit of
Arizona (June 30, 1983) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review
office).
114. Kudla & Jennings, supra note 99, at 14-18. Highly speculative or otherwise questionable offerings from a merit perspective may be registered in some states despite adverse comment from the administrator, based on a combination of
emphasized or expanded disclosure of the adverse information and an increase in
the suitability requirements for investors. These offerings are lumped in the studies into the list of offerings that have cleared a state, and are used to show that
merit regulation was not effective in particular instances, when in fact the merit
regulatory screen was applied to limit the investors to those who desire to make a
speculative investment and could afford to gamble with their investment funds.
115. The authors report that 350 survey questionnaires were mailed to issuers whose
performance was to be studied. Only 64 were returned with the requested data; 89
were returned without data; and 197 did not respond. Id at Exhibit 3.
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acts as a barrier to the free enterprise system, because their conclusion
rests on the fact that the approved companies typically had larger total
assets than withdrawn issuers.116 In short, the authors' conclusions are
unsupported by meaningful quantitative data, and thus cannot be considered a serious evaluation of the efficiency of the merit process.
V.

A NEW APPROACH TO MERIT REGULATION

A.

The Need/or Merit Regulation

This article has argued that both the advocates and opponents of
merit regulation have failed to provide the analysis and data needed for
a policy decision about the efficacy of merit regulation. Today, however, some state legislatures 117 are reevaluating the merit system and
are doing so on the basis of emotional arguments about how well the
system does or does not work. Something more is needed. In particular, some very basic data about the actual operation of merit regulation
is needed. No one knows what percentage of offerings receive merit
comments on initial review or what response is made to those comments. liB The extent to which those comments are implemented, explained, or turned into the basis for denial or withdrawal is unknown.
More importantly, perhaps, it is uncertain which of the comments are
of significant benefit to investors and which represent the mere triumph
of form over substance and consequently induce frustration, skepticism, and resentment. All of these data will be needed if one is to answer fully the fundamental question of social policy: Who needs merit
regulation? In the absence of these data, however, certain basic observations can be made.
The opponents of merit regulation can marshal philosophical arguments and provide specific examples of the failure of merit review as
to particular issues, but they have not yet produced any strong basis for
the claim that the merit system produces more social costs than social
benefits. No regulatory system works perfectly, and the suggestion that
a few failures destroy the value of the system is as ridiculous as suggesting that merit regulation is justified by the existence of a few
frauds. An evaluation of merit regulation cannot be made on the basis
116. Id at 17. The authors found that approved companies had a greater average asset
figure ($76,878,550) than withdrawing companies ($28,788,706). On the basis of
these fi~ures, which merely suggest that larger and more seasoned issuers have an
easier hme complying with merit regulation than new issuers, the authors leap to
the conclusion that "the merit review process discriminates against small issuers.
The effect of the merit review is to impede economic progress and business development by preventing small, capital-short businesses from raising capital in the
marketplace. The merit standards thus can create barriers to a free enterprise
system." Id
117. See Sargent, supra note 8, at 282-85.
118. It may not be possible to distinguish systematically between "merit" and "disclosure" comments, since the latter are often based on the need for fuller discussion
of aspects of the transaction that generate merit problems.
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of isolated instances on either side of the equation. As demonstrated
above, the existing quantitative studies have failed to make a conclusive or even meaningful contribution to an understanding of merit regulation. Before another study is attempted, the nature of merit
regulation as a whole must be understood, and its value must be defined in terms of relative costs and benefits.
Cost must be measured not only in economic terms but in human
terms as well. It must reflect not only the additional burden of regulation but also the burden that the regulation relieves. If the result of
merit regulation is that fewer failures occur or that investor confidence
is higher so that investments are more attractive in the market, then one
must counterbalance the loss of opportunity to go to market for a few
firms, the modification of offering terms for others and the direct costs
of compliance with the ease of capital formation that is provided for
issues that possess meritorious characteristics, the reduction of enforcement problems, the improvement of competition, and the monetary
benefit to investors.
The direct costs of merit regulation are obvious: filing fees, attorney's fees for blue sky work, and mailing expenses. In my experience,
these costs represent a miniscule percentage of the money raised and
are not in themselves a sufficient basis for challenging merit regulation
or blue sky regulation in its entirety.119 If merit regulation has value,
these limited costs are de minimis, and most of them would be present
unless all aspects of the blue sky laws were preempted. In any event,
the amount of time and money devoted to compliance with federal disclosure and accounting requirements far exceed these direct blue sky
costS.120 Furthermore, the compliance costs associated with merit regulation are similar to those generated by other forms of regulation.
Thus, these inherent regulatory costs must be accounted for and discounted when the costs specific to merit regulation are calculated.
The most significant cost of merit regulation is perhaps that of
time. 121 Clearance with multiple states may take several weeks because
some states are faced with substantial backlogs. Because time is often
of the essence for first-time corporate issuers and for real estate or other
programs requiring the purchase of specific properties, these delays
may be very costly. This factor is difficult to quantify but it is a pervasive concern of issuers and their counsel.
A second major cost is more elusive. This is the expense to busi119. For a discussion on the question of direct blue sky compliance costs, see Tyler,
supra note 4, at 932 (arguing that though he could not locate data on these costs,
they should be quantifiable); if. J. MOFSKY, supra note 5, at 31-32 (state registration involves "considerable cost"); Bateman, supra note 5, at 773 (merit regulation
"creates a pointless degree of confusion, paperwork and uncertainty").
120. See Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedures and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1,27-33 (1981) (discussing compliance costs with federal
disclosure and accounting requirements).
121. See Bartell, supra note 32, at 325-26 (discussing methods to avoid blue sky delays).
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ness created by the need to restructure an offering to comply with merit
guidelines. This kind of forced restructuring happens frequently, but it
is not clear whether or to what extent this possibility actually "kills"
potential public offerings. Because it is difficult to quantify these costs,
policy makers should exercise caution before concluding that this cost
of merit regulation outweighs its benefits to society.
Against these costs must be weighed the benefits of merit regulation. The central benefit, of course, is investor protection. A simple
reference to the concept of "investor protection" is misleading since
there are multiple categories of investors who require differing amounts
of protection. For example, the Uniform Act exempts from registration
certain offerings made to institutional investors.122 Some states have
special exemptions for sales to certain wealthy investors,123 or have implemented the accredited investor concept through the adoption of the
ULOE. These exemptions and exclusions reflect a recognition that
there are classes or persons whose need for protection varies substantially from that of the average investor. These investors are sophisticated, experienced, or able to hire professional advisers and advocates,
and are therefore presumed capable of judging fairness. 124 The federal
and state regulatory schemes are moving toward allowing unlimited
offers and sales to these persons in private offerings. 125 Although a few
years away from that ultimate conclusion, it appears to be a logical and
likely extension of current regulatory philosophy.126 If the wealthy or
sophisticated investor does not require the protection of regulatory review in connection with a private offering, he may not need it in connection with public offerings.
Many individual investors do not meet wealth and sophistication
suitability criteria and, as a consequence, cannot use the exemptions
that depend upon the character of the investor. They will still be able
to avoid the effects of merit regulation, however, if they purchase securities that are themselves exempt. 127 Some securities are exempted from
registration because of various market or jurisdictional considerations
122. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a)(8), 7A U.L.A. 639 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
123. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 451.802(b)(9)(D)(5) (West 1983); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 551.23(7) (West 1976).
124. NASAA Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~
5294 (Sept. 21, 1983) (accredited investors are persons deemed not to need the
benefits of securities registration because they meet certain objective criteria indicative of sophistication and risk-bearing ability).
125. See Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Deadwood Out of its Disclosure System?,
39 Bus. LAW. 833, 836-39 (1983).
126. Id.; see also Warren, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen
for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 355, 368
n.84 (1984) (development of the accredited investor concept in the federal exemption scheme).
127. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a)(I)-(II), 7A U.L.A. 638-40 (1978 & Supp. 1984) (listing
exempt securities).
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or because the securities are sufficiently regulated by other agencies. 128
For example, the Uniform Act provides an exemption for securities
listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges, both of which
are effective self-regulatory organizations. 129 Similarly, government securities,130 securities issued by nonprofit entities, 13 1 and commercial paperl32 are excluded because of the nature of the underlying security or
the existence of a special relationship affecting the purchase of these
securities. Finally, securities issued by financial institutions,133 utilities,134 and common carriers 135 are exempted because of the supervision of other government agencies that provide a level of merit
regulation.
The need for merit regulation arises in the context of public offerings of non-exempt securities. Many individual investors are neither
informed nor sophisticated about securities offered in that manner.
Furthermore, these investors have no intrinsic negotiating power. They
may collectively decide not to purchase a particular issue, but investors
do very little else collectively because there is no mechanism through
which they can share information to formulate decisions. If an investment fails, furthermore, they have almost no r~course because the cost
of securities litigation is so great that it is useless for investors who have
lost less than a very substantial amount or who are unable or unwilling
to become part of a class action.
The people who sell securities may even be less experienced than
the public investors, and often cannot or will not offer any guidance to
them. The market itself provides little information helpful to these investors, particularly with respect to initial public offerings. 136 The public investor lacks a practical means of acquiring prospectuses of
competing offerings for purposes of comparison; indeed, it is unlikely
that he would take the time to acquire them even if they were readily
available. Furthermore, the public investor lacks the information and
experience needed to compare different types of offerings. The typical
level of information and.sophistication applied to purchases of new se128. For analysis of the Vniform Act's treatment of exempt securities, see generally J.
LONG, 1984 BLUE SKY LAW HANDBOOK (1983) (surveying each of the Vniform
Act's securities exemptions).
129. VNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a)(8), 7A V.L.A. 639 (1978).
130. Id § 402(a)(I)-(2), 7A V.L.A. at 638.
131. Id § 402(a)(9), 7A V.L.A. at 639-40.
132. Id § 402(a)(IO), 7A V.L.A. at 640.
133. Id § 402(a)(3)-(6), 7A V.L.A. at 638-39.
134. Id § 402(a)(7), 7A V.L.A. at 639.
135. Id
136. It cannot be argued seriously that the market operates efficiently with respect to
initial public offerings. See Makens, supra note 39, at 153; Walker & Hadaway,
supra note 99, at 658-59. For a discussion on the limitations of the efficient market
hypothesis, see generally V.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
SECURITIES REGULATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL MARKETS 26-28 (1980) (efficient
market hypothesis is a useful means of asserting the effects of securities regulation
only if inherent testing problems are recognized).
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curities is thus surprisingly low. The public investor is most likely to
act on the basis of advice from ~ registered representative, a newspaper
story about the company or its product, or advice from an acquaintance
with similar investment interests and a similar lack of information.
The reputation of the brokerage firm or the particular registered representative is often far more important to this kind of investor than any
available information about the security itself. Brokerage firms thus
should be advocates of investor protection, but they often fail to fulfill
this role. In fact, the Securities Industry Association has recently taken
a position against merit regulation,137 reflecting its primary concern
with the impact of blue sky regulation on the ability of its members to
bring products to market.
The need for merit regulation would be substantially diminished if
underwriters consistently exercised strong due diligence in conjunction
with bringing new products to market. Indeed, if adequate due diligence were performed by underwriters then arguably only a small percentage of primary offerings would need to be reviewed by the states
for fairness. It is my impression, however, that the competitive economics of the securities business prevents many underwriters from engaging in the type of due diligence review that would make merit
regulation unnecessary.l38 To obtain underwritings, the underwriter
frequently must be willing to settle for less than a full measure of investor's rights. Some underwriters apparently consider those rights unimportant. In addition, an underwriter seeking to convince an issuer that
it should be allowed to handle a public offering has only limited ability
to compel alteration of the compensation taken by the issuer's promoters or insiders. Only if the issuer operates in a non-competitive market
for its product can the underwriter impose a substantial level of control
over compensation and conflicts.
As a result of these pressures, the underwriter's due diligence effort
ranges from excellent to inadequate and is, on occasion, completely absent. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of specific standards for
due diligence. 139 Proposals for government definition of these stan137. See Letter from Michael Kiey, Chairman, Securities Industry Association, State
Regulation Committee, to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, in connection
with SEC-NASAA Hearings on Federal-State Regulation, Washington, D.C.
(Sept. 9, 1983), at 212-13 (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review
office) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Michael Kiey]; Statement of Stephen
Bloomenthal, supra note 98, at 211-43.
138. For a study of both the practical and legal aspects of the "due diligence" concept
in connection with securities offerings, see NAT'L Assoc. OF SEC. DEALERS, SPECIAL REPORT, DUE DILIGENCE SEMINARS (July 1981).
139. No administrative agency, either state or federal, has defined specific standards of
due diligence. Accordingly, the level of due diligence applied by underwriters,
accountants, and attorneys to a particular offering is determined largely by their
willingness to adhere to the unwritten standards generally applied in the industry.
The level of due diligence thus varies widely, and may reach very low levels indeed, especially when smaller, less well-established regional underwriters are in-
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dards have been opposed by the underwriters and the brokerage community on the ground that specific standards would expose them to
potential liability in civil litigation. 140 As a regulator, I was continually
amazed by the number of underwriters and brokerage firms that totally
failed to explore in their sponsored offerings the nature and amount of
promoter compensation, the potential conflicts of interest, and the level
of disclosure about the intended use of the proceeds. If the prospectus
roughly complies with the SEC's disclosure format, many underwriters
feel quite comfortable, even though certain obvious facts may have indicated that additional inquiry should be made. 141
There are similar market pressures on brokerage firms. If the brokerage firm believes that the issue can be sold in the market, it is unlikely that it will take any steps to hold the price down for the benefit of
investors. That is not the nature of the marketplace. Since brokerage
firms lack an incentive to protect the investor,142 only the regulator can
protect him against an overpriced or over-hyped issue.
It is perhaps fair to say that new issues are customarily sold to
rather than bought by the public investor. This inherent market pressure, when viewed in light of the varieties of competing securities products, the lack of informed and critical analysis of new issues, the
paucity of information that is provided by most registered representatives to their customers, and the inadequacy of many due diligence reviews, creates a substantial need for investor protection. Merit
administrators fulfill the function of asking the questions and seeking
the underlying information that should have been asked and sought by
underwriters. 143 That, however, is only part of the blue sky process.
By applying merit standards, regulators perform the function that
neither the market, the underwriter, nor the brokerage firm can perform on a consistent basis: ensuring fair treatment of the public investor. By performing these interrelated functions of eliciting material

140.
141.

142.

143.

volved in the transaction. For discussion of how regional underwriters, rather
than national underwriters, tend to dominate the initial public offering market, see
Tyler, supra note 4, "itt 917-18. For a review on the role of underwriting forms in
highly abusive penny stock offerings, see Barnes, Bad Pennies, Venture, Nov.
1983, at 38, 44-46.
When Director of the Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau, I informally
suggested that the Bureau consider adopting by rule specific due diligence standards. The response from the industry was decidedly negative.
Merit regulation can perhaps be understood as in part a trade-off for the uncertainty about whether an appropriate level of due diligence will be applied. To the
extent that an appropriate level of due diligence could be mandated by law, merit
standards can and should be relaxed.
Brokerage firms may have an incentive to protect the investor to secure his repeat
business, but certainly not all firms take this view at all times. See Tyler, supra
note 4, at 919 (discussing the temptation to use hard-sell techniques in connection
with high-risk initial public offerings).
To the extent that the administrator serves this function, the underwriter, as well
as the public investor, is benefited.
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disclosures and regulating the substantive fairness of the offering, the
merit regulators try to speak for the investor.
Despite their efforts merit regulators are sometimes accused of attempting to enhance their own power, reputation, or budget at the expense of the industry and without any corresponding benefit to the
investor. l44 While this criticism is usually unfair and inaccurate, administrators are not without fault. The problem is sometimes one of
inflexibility. In my experience as both an administrator and private
practitioner, I have seen some well-intentioned administrators apply
merit standards in a rigorously mechanical way without considering
the overall character of the offering. As a consequence, issues will be
delayed by questions about the offering that have little, if any, relevance to the investor.
The problem may also be one of perspective. The administrator's
perspective on an offering may be skewed to the negative side since the
majority of investors with whom they meet are those who have lost
money or have been defrauded. As a result of this experience, virtually
all administrators would agree that it is better to prevent the loss from
occurring than it is to attempt to recoup the loss later. Accordingly,
some administrators evince a strong pro-investor bias. Taken to an extreme, this bias can lead to an "overkill" application of merit standards. 145 These criticisms are valid, and deserve to be taken seriously
both by NASAA and the individual merit administrators. In my opinion, however, most administrators recognize their inherent bias in favor
of protecting the investor and attempt to maintain a realistic view of
the needs of capital formation and the limits of their regulatory
responsibilities.
This article has contended that the central benefit of merit regulation is the administrator's attempt to speak on the investor's behalf. In
this role, the administrator attempts to provide what the marketplace
and the SEC cannot provide. The merit administrator's good faith attempt to play this role should be preserved. It is obvious that much can
be done to improve this system through the joint efforts of NASAA, the
SEC, the bar, and the securities industry.
-T'

B.

Recommendations

l.

Recommendations for NASAA

The current level of public criticism of merit regulation indicates
substantial problems with the merit regulatory system. Some of the
problems are mechanical. For example, it is inefficient to require that
144. See, e.g., Securities Industries Association, SEC-NASAA Hearings on Federal-State
Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Merle W.
Hopkins & Jerry L. Arnold, transcript of 3-4) (copy on file at the University of
Baltimore Law Review office); Letter from Michael Kiey, supra note 137, at 6.
145. See Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 1493.
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the same document filed with the SEC also be filed in fifty states. This
is more than a question of excess paperwork. Multistate filing means
multistate merit review, with all the potential problems that entails. A
more efficient means of allocating responsibility for merit review is
needed. There has been some experimentation in this area. For a period of six months in 1977, four states offered issuers the opportunity to
volunteer for a single regional review of offerings to be made in those
states. 146 Issuers refused to use the system largely because their attorneys were reluctant to abandon the relative certainty of their existing
relationships with each individual state examiner. 147 The current problem with multistate filings and multistate reviews is, in part, the result
of reluctance on the part of the bar and the brokerage community to
experiment with this system.
Another major problem has been the failure of the individual
states to adopt a uniform limited offering exemption compatible with
Regulation D.148 The current amalgam of inconsistent and inadequate
state private and limited offering exemptions generates confusion and
compliance costs without a matching benefit to investors. 149 This problem has intensified the criticism of merit regulation by forcing transactions exempt on the federal level and exempt in some states into
registration and merit review in other states. NASAA can help solve
this problem by vigorously promoting a policy of uniformity among its
members with respect to exempt transactions. ISO
An especially troublesome problem is that created by unqualified
or unprofessional examiners. Both NASAA and the individual states
should give more attention to training and supervision. This would
remove one of the major irritants in the present system.
Another important goal for NASAA should be detailed explanation of the policy decisions expressed in its merit guidelinesY I If
146. Those states were Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See H.
SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BLUE SKY REGULATION § 7.01, at 7-3 n.4 (1977).
147. See SEC, GOVERNMENT-BuSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION Part VII, at 13 (1982).
148. See generally Halloran & Linderman, Coordinating State Securities Laws with
Regulation D and Federal Integration Policy: State Limited Offering Exemptions
and Integration Standards, in STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 155 (D. Goldwasser & H. Makens eds. 1983) (substantial disparity among state limited and private offering exemptions persists).
149. See Sargent, supra note 16, at 502-06.
150. NASAA has already taken strides in this direction. See NASAA Committee Develops ULOE Adoption Chart to Help Promote State Uniformity, 15 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 2183 (Dec. 2, 1983).
151. A major flaw in NASAA's adoption procedure for guidelines has been its failure
to provide detailed explanations of the reasons for the actions proposed in the
guidelines. SEC releases are usually characterized by a preliminary policy statement. Unfortunately, NASAA guidelines have not contained this information,
placing commentators at a substantial disadvantage in interpreting the position
adopted by NASAA. In addition, once adopted the guidelines contain no explanation for the positions that have been assumed. Since many of the decisions are
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NASAA can clearly explain the overall purpose of the guidelines and
the specific purposes of their individual provisions, there will be less
blind application of specific requirements. Examiners can be given
more flexibility in clearing offerings, and counsel and underwriters
would be able to draft and negotiate with a better appreciation of the
guidelines' valid concerns. If NASAA begins to provide this kind of
careful, clear, and detailed explanation of its guidelines, a coherent philosophy of merit regulation will eventually develop.
NASAA also needs to take more positive steps toward developing
uniformity in merit regulation. Many states tend to act in a vacuum
when they develop their own merit rules or develop inconsistent interpretations of NASAA guidelines. These states tend to ignore the available means of sharing information. This situation should be remedied
and it can only be accomplished through greater pressure by NASAA
on its membership. NASAA should have as its goal "standards in securities regulation that are fair and reasonable and consistently applied
. . . . [T]he requirements should not be so burdensome as to unduly
impede or delay the marketing of those issues that are entitled to be
sold publicly."152 Achievement of this goal would eliminate much of
the hostility toward merit regulation.
2.

Recommendations for the SEC

If merit regulation is a substantial impediment to capital formation, it is remarkable that the SEC has taken such a low profile in discussions on the topic. Despite the political reasons for hesitation, the
time has come for increased SEC participation in this debate. The SEC
can participate in at least three ways.
First, the SEC can provide some important data needed for further
study of the problem. Only the SEC has the data needed to evaluate
the changes made in filing documents as a result of merit regulation,
because every public offering is registered with the SEC. Similarly, the
data regarding the withdrawal from and the avoidance of rigorous
merit states cannot be provided by any single state because none has all
of the pertinent data. The SEC and NASAA should consider a joint
attempt to produce and study these data to assess the impact of merit
regulation on the offering process.
Second, the SEC and NASAA need to reconsider the current allocation of regulatory authority. The SEC has clung tenaciously to jurisdiction over small offerings where state regulation would provide
adequate public protection. 153 Conversely, the states have continued to
economic rather than legal decisions, it would be of substantial assistance to the
public to have information far beyond that which NASAA now provides.
152. Hueni, supra note 6, at 1419-20.
153. Only Rule 504 of Regulation D (17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1983» shows any real effort
to defer to state regulation in connection with small offerings. See Securities Act
Release No. 6339, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,014,
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regulate offerings in connection with which the market's efficient absorption of publicly available information provides sufficient protection. 154 A question that has never received detailed consideration is to
what extent can or should the SEC and NASAA members divide responsibility for regulation of the different levels of the securities
markets.
Third, the SEC and NASAA need to examine the ways in which
their different regulatory techniques can or should interact. In particular, a joint SEC-NASAA study of the principal areas of disagreement
on disclosure and of the extent to which SEC-mandated disclosure can
address state merit concerns is needed.
The SEC must recognize the reality and importance of state regulation and take a more active role in its reform. In so doing, it should
be more attentive to the advice of the state administrators. If the SEC
had been more receptive to the states' suggestions during the drafting
of Regulation D,155 the fight for a uniform limited offering exemption
would have been less bitter. 156 While the Regulation D drafting experience is not the best model for the SEC's participation in the debate
over merit regulation, more SEC participation is necessary. In fulfilling its statutory mandate under section 19(c) of the Securities Act of
1933 to explore with state administrators ways to reduce the cost of
capital formation,157 the SEC can and should tum its attention to how

154.
ISS.
156.

157.

at 84,458 (Aug. 7, 1981); Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,106, at 84,909 (Mar. 8, 1982); see also
Sargent, supra note 16.
This problem is reflected in the continuing debate over the extent to which the
states should apply merit regulation to widely followed issuers not listed on the
national exchanges. See authorities cited in Sargent, supra note 16, at 500 n.l3.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1983) (Regulation D provides three separate exemptions from federal securities registration, together with a uniform set of definitions
and conditions).
NASAA participated to a limited extent with the SEC in the drafting of Regulation D. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, supra note 153, at 84,455; Securities
Act Release No. 6389, supra note 153, at 84,909-84,910. As originally proposed,
Regulation D contained provisions reflecting some of NASAA's particular concerns, such as restrictions on remuneration for sales efforts (Securities Act Release
No. 6339, supra note 153, at 84,464-84,465) and disqualification from eligibility
for issuers subject to recent actions by state administrators. Id. at 84,468. These
provisions were deleted from the final version of Regulation D. These changes,
together with a perception that Regulation D in general represents a refusal to
heed the state administrators' warning of the need for continued investor protection in exempt transactions, produced considerable resentment in NASAA and
have impeded the widespread adoption of a uniform limited offering exemption.
See Memorandum of NASAA Enforcement Liasion Committee to NASAA Small
Business Committee, Apr. 19, 1983, at 3 (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office).
Section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 (current version at IS U.S.C.A. § 77s(c)
(West 1982» provides:
(c)(l) The Commission is authorized to cooperate with any association
composed of duly constituted representatives of State governments
whose primary assignment is the regulation of the securities business
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it can help improve the conception and functioning of merit regulation.
The SEC's September 1983 joint hearings with NASAA on federalstate securities regulation were a step in the right direction,158 but more
must be done.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is time to stop spouting generalities and filling the air with emotional outbursts. If there are problems with merit regulation, they
should be documented and shared with NASAA so that attempts can
be made to correct the situation. It is easy to be a critic. It involves
little effort and often less thought. The critic without positive and realistic suggestions adds little to the improvement of the system and deserves little attention.
The securities industry, in particular, needs to reexamine its posiwithin those States, and which, in the judgment of the Commission,
could assist in effectuating greater uniformity in Federal-State securities
matters. The Commission shall, at its discretion, cooperate, coordinate,
and share information with such an association for the purposes of carrying out the policies and projects set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(2) It is the declared policy of this subsection that there should be
greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters, including(A) maximum effectiveness of regulation,
(B) maximum uniformity in Federal and State regulatory
standards,
(C) minimum interference with the business of capital formation, and
(D) a substantial reduction in costs and paperwork to diminish the burdens of raising investment capital (particularly by small business) and to diminish the costs of the administration of the Government
programs involved.
(3) The purpose of this subsection is to engender cooperation between the Commission, any such association of State securities officials,
and other duly constituted securities associations in the following areas:
(A) the sharing of information regarding the registration or
exemption of securities issues applied for in the various States;
(B) the development and maintenance of uniform securities
forms and procedures; and
(C) the development of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be agreed upon among several States or
between the States and the Federal Government. The Commission shall
have the authority to adopt such an exemption as agreed upon for Federal purposes. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as authorizing
preemption of State law.
(4) In order to carry out these policies and purposes, the Commission shall conduct an annual conference as well as such other meetings
as are deemed necessary; to which representatives from such securities
associations, securities self-regulatory organizations, agencies, and private organizations involved in capital formation shall be invited to
participate.
158. See SEC & NASAA, SUMMARY REPORT, SEC-NASAA CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL STATE SECURITIES REGULATION (1984) [hereinafter cited as SEC &
NASAA REPORT] (reporting joint hearings and conference on current problems in
state securities regulation).
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tion on merit regulation. 159 Because of the brokerage firm's intimate
relationship with the investor, the firm is perhaps best able to determine when and how merit regulation benefits the investor. The securities industry can help identify the specific merit concerns that are of
significance to the investor and define how due diligence standards are
affected by merit regulation. It can help one understand how some
aspects of merit regulation protect investors while others may unnecessarily impede capital formation. 160 The objections of the securities industry to merit regulation will become meaningful only to the extent
that these questions are addressed.
The securities bar also needs to do more. In fact, the bar may have
contributed to the merit "problem" by failing to take the lead in developing better systems. The credibility of its criticisms has been diminished by its inability or refusal to provide specific data corroborating
some of its complaints. This diminished credibility has reinforced
some administrators' perception that practitioners are merely hired
guns with no concern for investors. This perception is inaccurate, but it
is reinforced by those attorneys who posture and threaten in their dealings with administrators rather than present a sound case. If real progress is to be achieved, the bar must help to reduce the tension and
mistrust currently associated with the merit regulatory system.
The bar should function as neither an opponent nor a supporter of
merit regulation. Its role should be to contribute to a regulatory system
that works effectively for both investors and for issuers. In the long
run, a balanced approach will serve the best interest of both groups.
The organized securities bar has recently taken a step in that direction.
The ABA's State Regulation of Securities Commission of the Corporation, Banking, and Business Law Section has designated a subcommittee to study the elements of merit regulation and to consider its
functioning and effectiveness. 161 NASAA has established a similar
committee. 162 The opportunity for informed dialogue is here and
should not be lost.

159. See sources cited supra note 136 (comments of securities industry representatives);
see also Myriad 0/Approaches to Uniformity of State Regulation Urged at Hearing,
15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1737, 1738 (Sept. 16, 1983).
160. See SEC & NASAA REPORT, supra note 158, at 15 (discussing recommendation
that merit regulation be evaluated in terms of specific effects).
161. See ABA Suhcommillee to Study Merit Regulation, Allempt Neutral Review, 16
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 650 (Apr. 13, 1984).
162. The NASAA committee charged with this study of merit regulation is the
NASAA White Paper Project Committee, chaired by E.C. Mackey, Director,
Michigan Corporations and Securities Bureau. Telephone interview with James
L. Karpen, Committee Member and Director, Enforcement Division, Michigan
Corporation and Securities Bureau (June 19, 1984).

